large number of corporate bankruptcies japan property agency

This has led to the emergence of a large number of corporate bankruptcies japan property agency, financial institutions collapse, workers unemployment and other social problems, so it is hoped that active fiscal policy and loose monetary policy to avoid the implementation of “surgery” japan property agency, supplemented by the “stable lever” based on the repair of negative assets Various economic issues arising from deleveraging japan property agency. As a result, Japan’s deleveraging process has had a seesaw effect. On the one hand, the relevant Japanese departments have vigorously promoted active fiscal policies and loose monetary policies, and over-investment in infrastructure construction has made the leverage ratio of enterprises and financial institutions no longer decline japan property agency. On the other hand, it seems to be “hesitant” to clean up negative assets. The relevant Japanese authorities hope that through the active fiscal policy and loose monetary policy japan property agency, the economic downturn will be reversed, real estate prices will stop falling, and a large number of real estate credit bad debts and low-efficiency assets will become “quality assets”. Problems such as increased economic downturn will be solved. As a result, under the wave of deleveraging, the balance of Japanese bank loans continued to increase, and even reached a historical peak in 1998 japan property agency. In the eyes of a person in charge of domestic financial institutions familiar with Japan’s economic development, Japan’s abacus has achieved certain “effectiveness” in the short term. For example, the total bad debts of the Japanese banking industry has been adjusted back to 20 trillion yen, accounting for 2% of the total bank loan balance of 1000 trillion. But in fact, the actual bad debts that the Japanese banking industry needs to deal with is as high as 140 trillion yen, accounting for at least 7% of the bank loan balance, because many financial institutions use the capital liquidity to loosen the situation, and they will make a lot of real estate credit. Bad debts are “transferred” from the assets in the bank table. Taking consumer financial institutions as an example, under the stimulus of loose monetary policy in the 1990s, a large amount of Japanese capital entered this field, and through the use of new and old ways, it has issued high-value consumer loans to many low-income people. The funds are used to repay the real estate debt.A large number of personal consumption financial loans bad debts have returned to the banking system (because the main funds of consumer financial institutions come from bank loans), and the pressure on bad debts in the Japanese banking industry has further increased, making the difficulty of deleveraging soar. In his view, the emergence of this phenomenon, in addition to the speculative drive of Japanese financial institutions, another important reason is that Japan did not have the right medicine in the process of deleveraging – first comprehensively clean up negative assets, but intend to adopt active policy loose currency Measures to stimulate economic growth “turning decay into magic.” As the real estate prices in Japan continued to fall, the credit bad debts and low-yield assets continued to increase. The game of profiting negative assets even became more and more fierce, eventually bringing a heavier burden of bad debt write-offs to the entire Japanese economy, triggering for more than 20 years. The economy continues to be sluggish.